




HOW TO REPAIR IT?
JEAN PISANI-FERRY
Highlights
The European Union's heads of state and government have chosen euro-area
governance reform as a topic for immediate discussion and swift decisions. Any
serious discussion must start from an analysis of what went wrong. The superfi-
cial analysis has been that the crisis in Greece and elsewhere resulted from a
failure to implement existing rules. There is some truth in this, but the crisis also
reveals deeper governance flaws, which need to be recognised:
• Top-down government by statistics does not work (especially, but unfortuna-
tely not only, when they are wrong);
• Deterministic governance does not work in a stochastic world;
• Not all problems are fiscal;
• A commitment to no-assistance is not credible;
• Policy coherence is often lacking and ownership of the euro rules is tenuous.
If this view is correct, key choices for the euro area are:
• To reformulate the economic policy framework, 
• To decide on the degree of decentralisation that is desirable, and 
• To determine the reforms that are needed to ensure completeness of the
policy regime.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Brussels Economic Forum, at
an OBCE/Bank of Spain Madrid panel and at a Madariaga Brussels seminar. I
thank my Bruegel colleagues for comments and criticisms.
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WHAT WENT WRONG? HOW TO REPAIR IT?
JEAN PISANI-FERRY,JUNE 2010
FIVE LESSONS LEARNED
Five lessons have been learned – starting with the
most basic ones. 
1 Top-down government by statistics does not
work (especially, but unfortunately not only,
when they are wrong)
The Greek crisis has shown that the system in
place for monitoring public finances does not
work. From 2000 to 2008, the budget deficit noti-
fied to the European Commission in spring of the
following year was on average 2.9 percent of GDP.
In fact, the true figure was 5.1 percent, as shown
by revised data3. A monitoring system that pro-
vides such inaccurate estimates for so long is in
need of fundamental repair. 
There are several reasons for this failure. Two key
ones are certainly that the Greek statistical office
was under the control of the government, and that
Eurostat was not given by the EU Council the man-
date and the means to carry out on-site evalua-
tions. But the problem runs deeper. In any
organisation, a budget is a set of rules and proce-
dures whereby spending is accounted for and
monitored. For a government, it has a very differ-
ent purpose than national accounts, the role of
which is to record economic activity. Yet for rea-
sons of comparability, the whole EU budget-mon-
itoring system is based on the accounts prepared
by national statistical offices. The relationship to
the actual budgets of the various entities that






‘What went wrong in the euro area? Enforcement is certainly an important part of the agenda.
However we have learned much more from recent events and the lessons indicate that there are
more fundamental problems than weak enforcement.’
1. The European Council in
spring 2010 asked
president Van Rompuy
to chair a task force on
euro-area governance.
The task force is due to
deliver a progress report
to the June 2010
European Council.
2. See the remarks by
Herman Van Rompuy
following the second
meeting of the task
force on 7 June 2010.
3. See detailed data in
Marzinotto, Pisani-Ferry
and Sapir (2010).
A FAILURE OF IMPLEMENTATION?
What went wrong in the euro area? A simple
answer is that the rules are good but that imple-
mentation has been weak.
There is considerable truth in this: Greece in the
last decade defied the most basic provisions of
the European budgetary framework – and even a
fundamental tenet of EU membership, namely
trustworthiness. Several other member states,
some of which find themselves in difficulty, have
consistently flouted EU budgetary principles. In
the Irish and Spanish cases, the EU had, but did
not use, the legal means to tell them that the
course these countries were on was endangering
their own stability and the stability of the euro
area. Finally, beyond formal rules, the Eurogroup
had been given the mission to exercise vigilance,
and it did not.
It is therefore tempting to conclude that the prob-
lem the Van Rompuy Task   Force1 should address
is purely one of enforcement and strengthening
the existing EMU provisions. President Van
Rompuy has suggested that this is, at least in
part, the direction taken by the discussions2.
Enforcement is certainly an important part of the
agenda. However we have learned much more
from recent events and the lessons indicate that
there are more fundamental problems than weak
enforcement. It would thus be wrong to limit the
discussion to the design of additional incentive or
sanction procedures. has created problems from the very beginning. 
Furthermore the monitoring of budgetary situa-
tions within the framework of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) has gradually evolved in the
direction of putting emphasis on the structural, or
cyclically-adjusted, balance – a further statistical
construct. This economically sensible move was
intended to correct the pro-cyclical bias in the ini-
tial SGP, but measuring the output gap (which is
necessary for cyclical adjustment) is fraught with
considerable uncertainty, especially in times
when potential output is affected by shocks. This
puts the whole edifice of EU budgetary surveil-
lance on shaky foundations4.
Solving the contradiction between the economic
aim of preserving the stabilisation role of budget-
ary policy and making the surveillance framework
statistically robust is bound to remain a consider-
able challenge at EU level. 
2 Deterministic governance does not work in a
stochastic world
Spain moved between 2007 and 2009 from a two
percent of GDP budget surplus to an 11 percent
deficit, and Ireland from a balanced budget to a 14
percent deficit, while in the same period its debt
jumped from 25 percent to 64 percent of GDP. Only
a small part of these changes is accounted for by
discretionary decisions. So what we have learned
is that a country can move almost instanta-
neously from an apparently sound to an alarm-
ingly weak situation. In other words a
deterministic approach is of limited help in a sto-
chastic environment where tail risks can deeply
affect budgetary outcomes. 
This observation has two implications. First, it
raises a question mark over the very basis of
budgetary surveillance, namely that the sound-
ness of a country’s budgetary situation can be
4. For example the
Commission estimate of
the 2007 structural balance
has changed from a 2.1
percent of GDP deficit in
spring 2007 to a 3.7
percent deficit in spring
2010. For Ireland it has
changed from a 1.8 percent
surplus to a 1.6 percent
deficit.
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assessed with current data and forecasts. In such
a stochastic environment a 'value at risk' (which
we should perhaps call 'policy at risk') approach
is instead called for, which could, for example,
result in requests for lower public debt ratios being
made to countries that are more subject to such
risks, especially but not exclusively because their
financial sector is larger. 
The second implication of the observed speed of
change is that existing sanction procedures in the
framework of the SGP are inappropriate: a country
can be fined because its deficit has moved from
2.5 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP, but there would
be no point in fining it when the deficit is already
in double-digit territory.
The SGP is therefore facing more serious difficul-
ties than European policymakers are willing to
admit: on the one hand the preventive arm is made
largely ineffective by the combination of uncer-
tainties in estimating structural deficits and an
overly deterministic approach. On the other hand,
the corrective arm is made ineffective by the speed
at which the budget balance can deteriorate.
3 Not all problems are fiscal
The implicit assumption in the EMU framework
that threats to stability essentially arise from a
lack of budgetary discipline has proven wrong.
While the Greek case perfectly exemplifies how
budgetary indiscipline in a small country can jeop-
ardise financial stability in the euro area as a
whole, Spain and Ireland illustrate that budgetary
discipline, at least in the way it was assessed, is
not sufficient to avoid major threats to economic
and financial stability. The lessons to be drawn are
that fiscal risks need to be prevented more effec-
tively and that non-fiscal risks arising from credit
booms, asset-price developments or a sustained
appreciation of the real exchange rate need to be
addressed. This has in fact already been pointed
‘The implicit assumption in the EMU framework that threats to stability essentially arise from a
lack of budgetary discipline has proven wrong. Spain and Ireland illustrate that budgetary
discipline is not sufficient to avoid major threats to economic and financial stability.’out by the Commission (European Commission,
2008).
To be fair, the ‘it’s all fiscal’ assumption is nowhere
explicit in the treaty. On the contrary Article 121
(ex-99) is entirely devoted to the coordination of
economic policies beyond the mere enforcement
of budgetary discipline. But this pillar of economic
union has always been significantly less rigid
than the fiscal one based on Article 126. Not only
are the legal provisions weaker, but during the first
ten years of the euro, they were not really used5.
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines that were
supposed to be the backbone of coordination have
been consistently ignored by national policymak-
ers; the possibility of issuing a recommendation
was used only once – without effect.
As indicated by the European Commission in its
2010 communication, the lesson from experience
now calls for building a framework for surveillance
over and above budgetary dimensions. The chal-
lenge here is however to define and put into place
the foundations of such surveillance. The legal
apparatus can only be made effective if a con-
sensus is built on the economic underpinnings of
the prevention of imbalances. All international
experience – at European but also at global level
– indicates that it will be a significant intellectual
challenge to define benchmarks and thresholds
for the surveillance of external imbalances and/or
real exchange rate developments6.
4 A commitment to no-assistance is not credible
There was never a ‘no-assistance principle’ in the
treaty, only (and rightly so) a ‘no-coresponsibil-
ity’ principle for public debts (Article 125). Article
143, which limits the benefits of macro-financial
assistance to EU countries outside the euro area,
was not intended to prohibit assistance to those
participating in the single currency. This article
was only the result of the view that the members
5. The exception was 
Ireland in 2001, but
since the Council recom-
mendation was (proba-
bly rightly) ignored by
Ireland, this experience




and Sapir (2010) elabo-
rate on this point.
‘There was never a ‘no-assistance principle’ in the treaty, only a ‘no-coresponsibility’ principle for
public debts. But, until Greece, there was the belief that a member country would be allowed to






of the monetary union would no longer need bal-
ance-of-payments assistance (Marzinotto,
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2010). But, until Greece,
there was the belief that a member country would
be allowed to default, rather than be provided with
assistance.
No-assistance was furthermore not credible in
any case because any EU country can request
support from the IMF. The expectation that it would
simply have to default and that this would serve
as a deterrent to budgetary indiscipline (as can
be the case for US states) was therefore
unfounded.  
Ambiguity has now been removed: it is clear, first,
that euro-area countries are entitled to assistance
and, second, that this assistance must be part of
an IMF-led programme, with the usual conditions
attached. But this does not entirely clarify the
endgame. In fact one ambiguity has been replaced
by another: what if a member government benefit-
ing from EU assistance remains unable to regain
access to the market? Will it remain dependent on
an assistance lifeline? This question has been
made even more relevant by the European Central
Bank decision in May 2010 to embark on a gov-
ernment bond purchase programme, which cre-
ates a risk that the central bank will be trapped. As
long as this ambiguity persists there will be uncer-
tainty over how insolvency cases can be resolved.
And there will therefore be room for speculation. 
The availability of EU assistance does not neces-
sarily weaken ex ante discipline. IMF conditions
are harsh enough to serve as a deterrent and, fur-
thermore, potential support from EU partners may
strengthen calls for discipline because it gives
undisputable legitimacy to surveillance. But the
moves made in spring 2010 have exposed the
incomplete character of the rules of the game in
EMU and call for the treatment of insolvency to be
clarified. 5 Policy coherence is often lacking and owner-
ship of the euro rules is generally tenuous
Ultimately, the success of the euro depends on,
first, an (implicit) commitment to have in place
policies that are consistent with membership of
the monetary union and, second, on ownership of
the (explicit) principles and rules underpinning
EMU. This primarily involves governments but also
private agents. 
Coherence has often been absent since the euro
came into existence. Most governments after
1999 considered that euro-area management
could be delegated to central bankers and minis-
ters of finance but did not imply any significant
change to most domestic policies. Very few coun-
tries (Finland was an exception) bothered dis-
cussing if participation in a monetary union also
had implications for wage-setting. Several thought
they could reject further integration of product
markets, let alone labour markets7.
Ownership of the rules has remained very uneven
and generally tenuous. To take only one example,
from 1997 (when the country qualified) to 2007,
the government balance in France fluctuated
between a 1.5 percent of GDP deficit and a 4.1 per-
cent deficit whereas the SGP’s stated target is that
it should have been ‘close to balance or in surplus’.
This is prima facie evidence that this country –
among several others – has had no ownership of
the target it was committed to. 
Ten years into the euro, it is time to realise that
participation in a monetary union has significant
implications for policy much beyond the obser-
vance of the explicit treaty rules.
THREE DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE REFORM
These lessons suggest that the Van Rompuy Task
Force should not limit itself to proposing the
strengthening of existing provisions, but should
address unresolved underlying tensions, and
present strategic options for reform. The crisis has
exposed fault lines in the governance of the euro
area, and limiting reform ambitions to tinkering
7. As observed by Mario
Monti (2010), the twelve
worse offenders as regards
the delay for transposing
directives are all members
of the euro area.
8. Quote from Monnet’s
memoirs,  quoted by Padoa-
Schioppa (2010).
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with the SGP would be widely seen as being symp-
tomatic of a worrying inability to reform.
However, Europe's political situation is not
favourable for fundamental reform. A few years
after the failure of the constitutional project and
the ensuing odyssey of the Lisbon treaty, and at a
time when none of the EU's founding member
states (except Luxembourg) show an appetite for
further integration, the Monnet philosophy accord-
ing to which ‘l’Europe se fera dans les crises et elle
sera la somme des solutions apportées à ces
crises’8applies partially at best. It is true that the
Greek disaster of spring 2010 was an opportunity
to invent a crisis-management regime that did not
exist previously, but it is equally true that consid-
erable resistance to such a move was demon-
strated along the way. It is pure fantasy to imagine
that the crisis provides an opportunity for making
long-held federalist dreams into a reality. 
A realistic reform agenda must therefore ditch
long-held federalist dreams – such as a significant
increase in the EU budget, significant horizontal
transfers or a much tighter coordination of
national economic policies – and attempt to rec-
oncile the need for serious reform with the lack of
political momentum.
On the basis of lessons learned, three dimensions
of reform are worth highlighting. 
1 What policy framework?
The crisis calls for a redefinition of the euro-area
policy framework. As well as price stability, which
is assigned to the European Central Bank, in its
first ten years EMU has had budgetary discipline
as its main objective. Another objective, the ‘proper
functioning of economic and monetary union’,
was mentioned in Article 121 (ex-99), but was ill-
defined in the treaty and was not made opera-
tional through secondary legislation. 
The European Commission has (rightly) indicated
that macroeconomic surveillance should be
expanded ‘beyond the budgetary dimension to
address other macroeconomic imbalances’(European Commission, 2010). But this implies
that EMU now has three economic objectives (in
addition to the price stability objective):
• Budgetary discipline;
• Financial stability (which has emerged as
paramount in the aftermath of the crisis);
and
• The avoidance of macroeconomic
imbalances.
This complicates significantly the policy frame-
work for two reasons. First, these objectives are
partially distinct and partially overlapping and are
not defined with great precision. To take a con-
crete example, the EU in the 2000s could have told
Spain that it needed to reel in its real estate credit
boom because the boom involved budgetary risks,
or because it was a threat to financial stability. But
the EU could also have given Spain the green light
on the budgetary front, considering that financial
risks were sufficiently addressed by the Spanish
supervisor, and focusing on the macroeconomic
dimension.
Conceptually, it would be arguably sufficient to
adopt financial stability as the overriding objec-
tive as both fiscal crises and crises stemming
from macroeconomic imbalances ultimately
result in financial instability. After all, the reason
why the EU worries about budgetary or macro-
economic imbalances is because they represent
a potential threat to financial stability.
This is however only true in the long run and expe-
rience – including in this crisis – shows that budg-
etary or macroeconomic imbalances can persist
for a very long time before they ultimately lead to
financial turmoil. Furthermore, defining financial
stability as the overriding objective would not tell
us much about how to proceed operationally. This
is already an issue in defining the scope and
instruments of the European Systemic Risk Board. 
Budgetary sustainability could arguably also be
taken as the overriding objective. Indeed the
emphasis on strengthening the SGP in the Task
Force discussions suggests that this might be the
road taken. However to be effective, such an
approach would need to be very forward-looking
and would need to encompass a variety of risks
to the budgetary position – concretely to issue a
warning even when the budgetary situation looks
extremely sound. The experience with the imple-
mentation of a much cruder framework does not
bode well for a one-objective approach of this sort.
Operationally, therefore, it is preferable to retain
three distinct objectives. But this implies a refor-
mulation of the policy framework, so that assign-
ments are clearly defined.
This leads to the second difficulty. If euro-area
members are to meet three distinct objectives,
they need three instruments. As argued above,
and illustrated by the Spanish case (and also by
the experience of countries with a currency board,
such as Bulgaria), budgetary policy is clearly
insufficient for the avoidance of macroeconomic
imbalances. Supervisory instruments are also of
limited effectiveness in a financial-integration
context in which the responsibility for the stabil-
ity of financial institutions belongs to the home
country and the responsibility for the stability of
the financial system belongs to the host country.
This necessarily brings in another array of instru-
ments which can be of a regulatory or a tax nature.
Guidelines for wage formation may also be con-
sidered part of the required competitiveness mon-
itoring tool kit.
These instruments however are currently consid-
ered by many, including member state govern-
ments, as being outside the EU scope and
belonging at national level. Taking the reform of
the policy framework seriously requires saying
how wide the scope of coordination has to be and
if it should involve the use of such instruments.
2 How much centralisation?
The attempt at enforcing budgetary discipline
from the top in the first ten years of EMU has not
been without impact but it has not been a great
success either. Federal solutions implying a sig-
nificant reallocation of budgetary responsibility to
the EU level, or much tighter control from Brussels





CONTRIBUTION9. See the remarks by
Herman Van Rompuy
following the second
meeting of the task force on
7 June 2010.
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A move to a more asymmetric system can also be
observed when considering the macroeconomic
imbalances objective. In fact, as other euro-area
members are bound to increasingly monitor their
competitiveness relative to Germany, Germany
could end up in the role of anchor for wage-setting.
It is a strategic choice for the EU if governance
reforms should accompany and even encourage
decentralisation by providing an umbrella frame-
work for national rules and institutions, and by
rewarding countries with better institutions or
rules. There are strong economic and political-
economy arguments in favour of such an approach,
because decentralisation may be the best way to
strengthen the ownership of policy rules.
Were this to happen, there would remain a signifi-
cant but much-transformed role for the European
institutions: the Commission and especially Euro-
stat would need to be equipped with enhanced
capabilities for monitoring and evaluation, in order
to ensure the comparability of national situations
and to help disseminate good practices. They
would also need to make the degree of intrusive-
ness of the monitoring dependent on the quality
of national rules, procedures and institutions
(thereby giving incentives to domestic reforms).
These changes would admittedly represent a
break with the past, and would require a long tran-
sition period.
3.Which reforms to ensure completeness of the
policy regime?
A policy regime is a set of principles and rules the
properties of which can be assessed from a logical
standpoint. A particularly important property is
completeness – ie how the policy regime behaves
in different conditions and how ex anteincentives
relate to ex postrules. 
On public debts and deficits, the Maastricht regime
‘Priority will likely be given to strengthening top-down surveillance. But it is perfectly possible to
imagine an alternative scenario in which budgetary discipline would result from a combination
of market forces and institutional reforms at national level.’
this situation the question arises of whether the
EMU objectives, especially budgetary discipline,
are more likely to be achieved in a more decen-
tralised system.
President Van Rompuy9has indicated that priority
will be given to strengthening top-down surveil-
lance. The assessment of national budgetary
plans by the European Commission and the
Eurogroup before national parliamentary discus-
sion starts, the introduction of sanctions that
could start kicking in already before the three per-
cent of GDP threshold is reached, and the
increased emphasis on public debt in the exces-
sive deficit procedure all go in this direction.
But it is perfectly possible to imagine an alterna-
tive scenario in which budgetary discipline would
result from a combination of market forces and
national-level institutional reforms. As Germany
has now adopted a new budget rule and has
started to act in accordance with it, and as mar-
kets benchmark the fiscal creditworthiness of
each participating country against Germany, there
is a new logic gaining momentum that could result
in Germany again becoming the anchor, with other
member states emulating its reforms. Several EU
countries have introduced effective domestic
budget rules; recent French announcements go in
this direction. The UK also is overhauling its budg-
etary policy framework. Thus, in a way, policy
competition has started to replace policy coordi-
nation as the engine for budgetary discipline.This
is exactly what happened twenty years ago in the
monetary field. The Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) of the then-European Monetary System
was created in 1979 as a perfectly symmetric
system with the ECU as its anchor. By the late
1980s it was increasingly evident that it had
turned into an asymmetric system with the
German mark at the centre. The question now is
whether the SGP – today’s anchor – will in the
same way be superseded by a national anchor.was incomplete because it was entirely based on
crisis prevention and had no room for crisis man-
agement and resolution. When the crisis hit, it was
felt that to let a member country default was too
risky, and there was no choice but to invent on the
spot a crisis-management regime. With the cre-
ation of the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF), the rules of the game of this crisis-man-
agement regime have been rather clearly spelled
out, especially as they draw on the principles and
procedures of the IMF. But this raises a new ques-
tion, which is how to redefine the relationship
between ex ante surveillance and ex post crisis
resolution. On this, the IMF has no answer.
As regards debt crises, it is hardly imaginable to
return to the previous regime. Therefore, a full
crisis-resolution regime needs to be defined,
which sets out in detail the principles and modal-
ities of assistance, debt restructuring and possi-
bly exit. If exit is (sensibly) ruled out because of
its potential spillover effects, then this only
strengthens the case, as proposed by Germany
(Federal Ministry of Finance, 2010), for defining
the debt-resolution regime. As the EU is a commu-
nity of law, there is a strong case for establishing
rules and procedures for a statutory European
Debt Resolution Mechanism. Current reluctance to
create expectations of an imminent default should
not be an excuse for refusing to work out the prin-
ciples on which EMU reform needs to be based.
Half measures now would only perpetuate the
incomplete character of the system. 
The definition of a crisis-resolution regime would
make room for innovative crisis-prevention solu-
tions, such as the proposal of Jacques Delpla and
Jakob von Weizsäcker (2010), who suggest cre-
ating a dual bond market, distinguishing for each
country between ‘blue debt’ amounting to 60 per-
cent of GDP at most, for which participant coun-
tries would have joint and several responsibility,
and ‘red debt’ above the 60 percent threshold, for
which each country would be individually respon-
sible and on which partial default would be possi-
ble. Such a scheme would give markets a greater
incentive to price default risk fully at the margin.
CONCLUSIONS
Discussions on euro-area governance have been
going on at least since the first negotiations on
the creation of the euro. They have not been set-
tled because of ambiguities in the positions of the
key participating countries, especially France and
Germany, and because of ambiguities in the com-
promises they have reached (Pisani-Ferry, 2005).
But something new has happened. As Keynes
reportedly asked, ‘When the facts change, I change
my mind. What do you do?’ This crisis is indeed an
opportunity for clarification. In order not to waste
it, the Van Rompuy Task Force and the European
Council should resist the temptation to patch up
divergences and tinker with the existing policy
framework. Rather, they should take the opportu-
nity to address fundamental questions about the
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